2 contrast to those inputs that do not require immediate cash outflow. The second section presents a model of input use where there is a difference between on-farm and off-farm returns to a farmer's human capital, and shows that under failure risk the use of non-cash-draining inputs may increase with a decrease in output price. The third section presents a specific partial equilibrium model to illustrate the concepts developed in the second, and to demonstrate the possible effects of failure risk on equilibrium output price. The fourth section turns to the practical application of the ideas developed in this study and to the role commodity programs play in reducing the effect of costly farm failure. The empirical analysis is of com production in Illinois using the model of how the threat of failure affects input choices. The study focuses on the affects of fann size and other structural variables on fanner divergence from strict profit maximization.
Farmer Behavior under Risk of Forced Adjustment
Two major sources have been hypothesized regarding the fixity of physical assets.
The first involves the lumpy nature of the production process. Galbraith and Black, for example, hypothesize that large fixed costs associated with reorganizing the fann operation make short run adjustment unprofitable. Changes in the economic environment would induce changes in productive capacity only if they were of sufficiently high magnitude and of sufficiently long duration. The second source of fixity involves the difference between the on-farm value of assets and their alternative, off-farm value (G. Johnson and Quance). Low salvage value may reflect transportation costs, specificity of capital to the farm operation, and limited, asymmetric information regarding quality of the item (Akerlof) . Whatever the cause of low salvage values, once acquired productive capacity changes only with discrete (perhaps large) changes in the on-farm-use value.
A fanner's human capital is subject to a similar fixity. Although a fanner's labor may be divisible between on-farm and off-farm employment, his human capital ' I , i , .
I 3 specific to farm management is lumpy. Or from another perspective, one may view the "salvage" value of human capital (the opportunity cost of being a farm manager) as less than the on-farm value (the opportunity cost of not being a farm manager). The discrepancy between a farmer's salvage value and his on-farm value may reflect the specificity of the capital and/or the personal, or psychic, premium on earning an income from owning and operating a farm l In dollars (accounting for moving costs, etc.), a farmer may seem to have a high salvage value, but in utility, derived from these non-farm dollars, the salvage value is low.
A notable distinction between a farmer's human capital and other factors that may be subject to fixity is that certain minimal expenditures are necessary in order to stay in farming. The fann family must eat, clothe itself, and otherwise live happily alongside its neighbors. In addition, the decision to farm may incur other fixed commitments: minimal debt service, minimal use of certain publicly-provided goods (e.g., water), insurance, and so forth.
The adjustment of a fanner's human capital out of agriculture is not always an active decision. Forced adjustment occurs when fann production does not cover the minimal, necessary costs. Without this risk of forced adjustment, or failure, the farmer would simply compare the expected utility of farming with the utility of leaving farming and make the optimal discrete decision to continue. Instead the risk of failure leads to seemingly inefficient production decisions.
Input response to risk may entail anything from too-quickly depleting soil quality, to placing greater stress on farm labor at the expense of leisure. 2 Inputs that are purchased prior to the production process are under-utilized in the sense that their marginal products are higher than what would be optimal under strict maximization. Those that can be utilized without immediate cash expenditure ("mined" or "borrowed off of'), such as soil quality and farm household labor, are over-utilized. Commodity production may be increased or decreased, relative to the case where there is no ·. ' , .
, 4 difference between on-farm and off-fann utility, depending on the degree of complementarity of factors.
An Algebraic Model.
A model of a farmer's behavior under risk of failure is inherently intertemporal.
The farmer must trade-off the amount of utility he gets in any year from farming with the probability of failure.3 Intertemporal models may lead to intractable complications; therefore, the following mathematical model makes certain simplifying assumptions.
Specifically, the farm manager faces a discrete difference between on-farm and offfarm returns; random events independent over time; the alternative utility that the farmer receives off the fann, if he fails, is a constant value; and once failed the farmer leaves farm management forever. These assumptions produce the following results.
Farm decision rules as functions of prices are constant over time; the expected fannderived utility in any period is constant; the cost of moving out of agriculture is the difference (also constant) between optimal yearly expected farm-derived utility and off-farm utility. Furthermore, the farmer's objective function can be written in terms of yearly expected farm-derived utility, off-farm utility, and the probability of failure.
A farmer yearly produces a commodity, the per-acre amount of which is denoted by y, by combining two factors of production: 1) x are those which must be yearly purchased out of cash revenues prior to realization of actual production and price received, and 2) k are those which may be utilized in the year but paid for -in the indeterminate future. Examples of the factor x include hired labor, fertilizer, etc.
Examples of input k include land quality, farm household labor, owned machinery, etc.
The per-acre production function in a given year is given by y = y(x,X,e) ;
(1) where e represents some random effect on output y, such as weather. The number of acres produced is given by A, which is a constant. The farmer faces every year an unknown price p, a random variable (p >0, E fp] = Il), with some time-invariant probabil-, " . , ;
, .
, 5 ity density function given by g (P) . The constant per-unit cost of the factor x is given by w, and of factor k is given by i.
Failure is defined as inability to cover the minimal expenditures in a year necessary to farm, /; that is, failure is defined by
If the farmer fails, he leaves farming and earns some sure utility level I each year thereafter. For ease of presentation, we assume that production is certain and price is the only random variable. This particular assumption is relaxed in the next section.
Pd
The yearly probability of failure, n, is given by n(x }c) = Jg (p )dp; where o PdY -wx =/ /A. The utility from farming in any year is given by
and the expected utility from farming is simply
Finally, the constant discount rate for future expected utility (either from farming or not farming) is given by~. Define UN as the expected value of utility from farm income conditional on not failing, Up as the expected value conditional on failure. 
The term I P/(l-P) is the expected earnings from agricultural work, after failure. (Note the discount factor on this off-fann income is J31(I-P), not lI(l-P), because the farmer starts earning I the year following failure.) The term [I -PO -n)] represents the . "
• 'f , .
6 discount rate of future incomes. As the probability of failure increases, the farmer would tend to discount the future more heavily.
A more compact representation of the fanners criterion function is derived by subtracting from V in expression (6) the income stream if the fanner left agriculture before the first year:
The value V() represents the rent, or surplus, from being a fann owner. The numera- Let k* and x* satisfy the first-order conditions of maximizing the objective function given by expression (7)5:
marginal utility is given by V'. The parameter 0 measures the influence of human capital fixity (measured by V) on farm production decisions. Expression (8c) makes explicit that the influence of human capital fixity on production depends on several elements: the discount rate, the probability distribution of price, fann size, and the correlation of marginal utility and price. If fixity has no influence on production decisions, then 0 = 0, and as 0 grows production decisions deviate from strict maximization. Compare these first order conditions to that of strict maximization of E [V] :
Because 0 > 0, the fanner appears to over-utilize k based on conventional marginal conditions. Further, it is reasonable to suppose that the critical price defining failure, , . Now suppose the rest of the economy improves relative to the agricultural sector.
As the costs of failure (U -I) grows insignificant, then 9~, and the farmer behaves as if he were maximizing the utility derived solely from farming (U). We may intexpret g (Pd) as a measure of the degree to which a farmer can marginally influence the probability of failure via production decisions. For example, if random price were associated with a familiar bell-shaped probability density function, then farmer input decisions decreasing Pd by a unit at low levels would have less affect on the probability of failure than if Pd were decreased by a unit near the mean price. Suppose the probability distribution of commodity price changes such that g (Pd)~0 (that is, suppose the bell-shaped density of price shifts rightward with an increase the the mean price), then farm decisions move toward production efficiency. Regardless of potential cost of failure (Le., U -I), if there is no influence at the margin, g(Pd) =0, then again the farmer acts as if he were maximizing farm-derived utility. One point to be emphasized from this discussion of expression (8) is that in this model human capital fixity (v > 0) is necessary but not sufficient to cause "inefficient" production decisions.
With the general representations of V () and g () one cannot immediately determine the effect of changing farm size on the optimal choices of factors. Although Pd decreases with an increase in A, which decreases 9, g(Pd) may decrease or increase. In addition V increases with an increase in farm size, positively affecting 9. If, however,
Pd is small relative to Jl, then g (Pd) likely decreases with farm size (as would be the case if P were normally distributed). The effect of decreasing f, and thus decreasing the probability of failure, would bring k* and x* into line with productive efficiency.
To be more specific, suppose the farmer is risk neutral; that is,
The first order conditions may then be written as a .
As noted above, relative to e= 0, the marginal product of k is set lower and the marginal product of x is set higher. (This is true given Pd < J..l.) What happens to the actual levels of k and x depends of the degree of substitutability. For example, suppose k and x represent single factors. Let the parameter e begin from a point where fixity has no influence on production, either because the cost of failure is zero (V =0), or because the farmer has no influence at the margin over the probability of failure
The following comparative statics show the effect on factor decisions due to an increase in e, indicating an increase in the influence of fixity. Differentiating (9a) and (9b) with respect to k, x, and e yields:
where~> 0 is the determinant of the matrix of second partial derivatives of Y with respect to x and k, which is assumed negative definite. Not surprisingly these effects are of ambiguous sign. However, if the two inputs are substitutes (i.e., Y.d:), then the effect of increasing the measure of fixity, V, or of increasing at the margin the farmer's influence on the probability of failure, g (Pd) , is to decrease the use of cashdraining inputs and increase the use of those inputs which are not cash draining:
: > 0 and~~< O. This will hold for some x and k where the inputs are complements; that is, where Y.d: is positive but sufficiently close to zero. The derivative of total product with respect to e represents the effect on supply of increasing the importance of immediate cash revenues. Increasing the deviation of optimal input decisions from strict profit maximization may either increase or decrease supply, again depending on the degree of substitutability of inputs:
2l. _ 2! ax ae -Yk ae + Yx ae Note that for e = 0, one can solve the above comparative static results to find that the sufficient condition for output to increase is given by Yu <~Yu. 
A Special Case: An Over-Production Trap
This section considers a specific model of a producer's behavior under risk of forced adjustment. This example is presented in two parts. In the first, the producer avoids risk by expending greater effort in producing a cash income in order to increase the likelihood of covering the minimal necessary expenditures to retain farm ownership. The purpose here is to show the possibility of a backward-bending supply curve, the discrete jumps in supply that may occur at various level of expected price, and the conditions under which a reduction in price variance reduces supply and improves productive efficiency.
The second part of this example considers market equilibrium. A stable, long-run equilibrium is defined where the probability of forced adjustment is zero, and where expectations are rational. This example shows that rational-expectations equilibria can " :
• I 10 arise where the producer is permanently taking the risk of failure into account when making production decisions (Le., producing "inefficiently"), but the observed probability of failure is zero.
We will term the producer behavior where output expands in response to falling output price survival mode, and the equilibrium where supply is backward bending, with a zero probability of failure, a survival mode equilibrium. If an outside observer finds a small probability of forced adjustment or failure, this does not necessarily imply the farmer is out of survival mode and making decisions based on maximizing farm-income-derived utility. Causality may flow the other way. This example demonstrates a case zero probability of failure exists, the farmer is rationally producing "inefficiently" (Le., contrary to strict profit maximization), and supply increases with a fall in expected price. The important point is that the probability of failure is low (in this case, zero) because the farmer produces in this (strictly defined) inefficient manner.
Funhermore, if a survival-mode equilibrium exists with an inelastic demand curve, then another rational-expectations equilibrium with productive efficiency also exists. This two equilibria condition illustrates an over-production trap. That is, due to over-production, market conditions are such that over-production is optimal for individual farmers. Moreover, if in concen farmers reduced production to that of a conventional equilibrium, no individual would have incentive to expand. With an _elastic demand curve a survival-mode equilibrium may exist, but this cannot strictly be called a trap, because only a single rational-expectations equilibrium exists.
Suppose there is one competitive farmer in the market producing some level of commodity, y, out of effon, e, and receiving some level of price, p. Production is random, and, therefore, so is price. Although price depends on quantity, the farmer acts as if he had no influence over its probability distribution function. Let the utility function from farming be the sum of the goods consumed out of farm revenues, py,
11 over some minimal expenditure f, and leisure time: To summarize, the fanner's objective function is given by
where U(e) is the expected farm-derived utility, 1 the alternative utility of leaving farming,~the personal discount rate, and 1t the probability of failure. The probability of failure may take on three values depending on the chosen level of output-If the fanner expends so little effort that even at the highest possible price cash receipts do not cover minimal expenses, then the probability of failure is one. If on the other hand the farmer expends enough effort that even at the lowest possible price receipts cover minimal expenses, then the probability of failure is zero. For levels of effort in a middle range, either the farmer fails or he does not, depending on the outcome of price. The probability of failure is the probability of the low price being realized, which in this example is 50%.
12
An important aspect of this model to note is that, except at the boundaries of these regions, expending incrementally any more or less effort will not affect the farmers probability of failure; it will only increase or decrease his benefits from farming.
One may set. without loss of generality, the non-farm utility level to zero, J = O.
Consistent with the condition cited above, the objective function may then be represented in one of three ways, depending on whether the farmer's effort makes the probability of failure one, one-half, or zero:
2ulJ.1
(13c) 
2ulJ.1 that is, optimal effort is chosen such that the probability of failure is zero. This illustrates the danger of taking observed probabilities of failure as exogenous to the farmer's supply decisions. Here there is no chance of failure, but the level of effort chosen is away from the point of "efficiency," (e = 1J.2), which would be optimal if risk of failure were irrelevant to decisions.
Optimal effort is conditional on regions in which expected price may fall.
Optimal supply over expected price is graphically illustrated in figure 2. The farmer I may not choose to be on a portion of the supply curve where 7t = '2' instead either , . , u choosing a supply where 7t =0, or where 7t = 1. The downward sloping portions of the supply curve are the regions of expected price where the farmer is in survival mode.
The effect of eliminating price variability, abstracting from equilibrium effects, is illustrated in figure 2 . Consider a expected price of p.. Eliminating variance (Le., setting ", = ".) yields an optimal supply of y* = 2p.2.
Now consider the market equilibrium. A stable, long-run equilibrium is an expected market price, J.lc, a level of effort e. *, and an expected supply~*, such that the number of producers is constant (Le., 7t =0), and where
e. * =e* ij!.) (15c) Equation (l5a) represents market equilibrium, (15b) represents the optimal expected supply given the optimal choice of effort, and (15c) represents the rational-expectations equilibrium where optimal effort is consistent with the equilibrium expected price.
Stability implies that equilibrium price falls along the segments cd and dj on the supply curve in figure 2. The most interesting case is where the farmer is in survival mode, but 1t = 0; that is, on segment cd of figure 2. 
In fact, for all cases of demand, the above condition is simply that which provides for the standard (non-survival-mode) equilibrium. That is, if a survival-mode 14 equilibrium exists, then a conventional one does also. A conventional equilibrium exists where
An elastic demand may also yield a stable, survival-mode equilibrium, but if one does not exist, then a conventional one would not exist as well. (The inequality in expression (18) above is reversed.) This leads to the idea of an over-production trap.
For both inelastic and elastic demands, survival-mode equilibria may exist. But only in the fonner case is one justified in using the tenn trap. In the latter case, survival mode arises due only to the objectives of fanners: In the inelastic-demand case, survival mode exists because of the objectives of fanners and the accident of expectations consistent~ith survival mode. Fanners are trapped by their rational expectations;
without altering fanners' objectives, a conventional equilibrium may be attained.
Empirical Application
The preceding sections have discussed the influence of human-capital asset fixity on production decisions. This section empirically addresses farm production based on the conceptual model. First, even under risk-neutrality the usual assumptions underlying the use of cost and profit functions are inapplicable in this case, because the marginal-product-equals-price rule does not hold. Therefore, even if one used only disaggregated data, the conventional correlations of cost shares, for example, with factor prices would not represent production technology as standard application of duality theory would suggest. The difficulty is that marginal products are set to effective prices, which are unobserved. These effective prices are the observed prices adjusted by other factors reflecting the influence of the discrete difference between on-fann and off-farm utility, and the probability of failure.
In standard applications, there are estimable equations for a production function (or cost, or profit) function and each marginal condition. If there are n choice variables , . , " 15 with associated prices, the standard application would have n + 1 equations from which to estimate the parameters r~presenting the production technology (n input demands, one output supply). One may solve n input choice variables for n prices, all of which can be observed. In the non-standard case described above, however one can only solve for the choice variables in terms of the n prices and two price-adjustment factors, 1/(1 + 9) and (1 + 9J!..)/(1 + 9) from equations (9a) and (9b). Nevertheless, the Pd marginal rates of technical substitution between inputs with common adjustment factors. are dependent only on observable prices. Therefore, at best n -2 choice variables can be solved in terms of observable prices and two inputs associated with different adjustment factors. And, one can obtain n -1 equations from which to estimate production func;tion parameters ( n -2 input demands, one output supply). This is not surprising, because this model introduces at least two additional unknowns into the choice problem. Under risk-neutrality, besides the parameters defining technology, the true cost (iJ -I) of leaving farming in any period is unobserved, as is the true probability of failure as a function of farm decisions. In order to estimate the production function parameters, unconditioned on the on-fann/off-farm utility difference and the failure probability, one must allow for the influence of these two additional unknowns through some similar number of observables.
To illustrate the conceptual and theoretical models above, we examine corn production in lllinois. This study estimates a per-acre production function, assuming a particular production function, and utilizing the plausible restrictions on parameter estimates implied by the behavior model of a profit-maximizing farmer. Of course, other models also could result in production inefficiency, defined here as a wedge between marginal products and observed prices. The empirical analysis tests whether the adjustment factors driving a wedge between marginal products and prices, move in the direction implied by the conceptual model of input decisions under risk. Specifically, the empirical model tests whether or not input choices approach productive efficiency as fann SIze increase and over time (as fanning is hypothesized to grow more integrated into the larger economy). Additionally, in recognition of the widespread farmer use of government programs and their influence on risk and farm decisions, the analysis examines to what degree programs affect the deviation of input choice from productive efficiency.
The empirical analysis takes four inputs (in per acre amounts) to a Cobb-Douglas production function. Consistent with the conceptual model, the inputs are separated into those that must be paid for immediately, fertilizer and hired labor, and those that may go unpaid, farm family labor and physical capital, represented by machinery use.
In order to reduce the scope of the problem, the possible influence of other crops is Yield is represented by Y, and input levels by Xj ; where i = 1 denotes fertilizer, i = 2 hired labor, i = 3 family labor, and i = 4 machinery. The wj represent prices associated with the inputs, and the <Xj represent associated elasticities to be estimated. We assume risk neutrality of farmers and that output price is independent of output. The
March quote of the December futures contract for com represents the expected output 
Therefore, one can specify the system of equations (22a From the discussions in the previous sections, one expects that as farm size grows the adjustment factors approach one, falling (b t < 0) in the case of fertilizer and hired labor (i = 1,2), and increasing (b 2 > Or in the case of family labor and machinery (j = 3,4). These effects reflect that the fixed costs of farming that must be covered in order for the farmer to remain in agriculture do not grow in proportion with farm size.
The larger operations relative to the smaller ones spread these fixed costs over a greater number of acres, and thus optimally sets marginal products closer to observed factor prices. The time index, T, reflects an overall improvement in alternatives for farm family labor, growing integration of the farm sector and the larger economy, and other structural changes that promote stricter profit-maximizing (that is, Ct< 0 and
One variable of special concern indicating the integration of farm labor into other sectors is the relative importance of off-farm income to the total farm family income.
As the family grows less dependent on uncertain production-based returns and more dependent on sure, off-farm sources, the farmer places less weight on avoiding poor crop revenues (et < 0 and e2 > 0). This effect would best be measured by the propor-, ..
tion of off-farm income relative to total income for specific farm families. This set of data was unavailable. Instead the model takes the proportion of total non-farm income earned by U.S. farmers relative to total income from both farm and non-farm sources.
Thus the data only reflect aggregate changes in off-farm income to commercial enterprises. 9
The program variable, D, reflects farmer's response to government payments.
Three effects from government programs can be identified. First, programs may reduce the risk of failure and thereby promote efficiency. Second, programs may increase the opportunity cost of leaving fanning, at the same time reducing failure risk, and thereby promote inefficiency. Third, programs may increase the effective output price through target prices. Despite these three distinct effects, one may be able to detect which has the greater influence by examining the pair of coefficients d t and d z.
If the first effect predominates, then the signs of the coefficients on D is expected to be positive for family labor and machinery (d z >0), and negative for fertilizer and hired
If the second effect predominates, then the signs on this coefficient will be reversed (d t >0 and d z < 0). Finally, if the third effect predominates, then the signs on both coefficients will be negative for both equations (d t < 0 and d z < 0).
Using the first order conditions, specify four additional equations: Finally, the coefficients on the program variable are of opposite signs for the two adjustment-factor equations, and support the conclusion that government programs exacerbate the deviation from production efficiency.
Concluding Comments
The analytical and empirical results of this paper offer some insight into farmer behavior under risk of failure. A farmer cannot purchase complete insurance against such a risk. In addition to other responses (e.g., crop insurance, access to credit reserves) the farmer would seek to mitigate against this risk by deviating in his production decisions from what is optimal from a simple expected-profit maximizing case.
Production factors with immediate cash outlay tend to have higher effective prices than without the risk, since part of their cost must be measured in the contribution to increasing the probability of failure. The marginal products of these factors are set higher than observed prices would optimally warrant. Conversely, factors that may be delayed in cash expenditure tend to have lower effective prices for the opposite reason, and their marginal products are set lower than observed prices warrant.
Factors of the last type are of particular interest, since their contribution to aggregate capacity may be of greatest significance. Farm-operator labor, or farm family labor, tends to be over-utilized at the expense of non-cash-generating alternatives (e.g., leisure time). Improving opportunities for off-farm income would encourage the fanner to use operator labor in a similar manner to hired labor. Physical capital, including aspects of land quality and long-term productivity, owned by the farmer is treated in the same way. The conceptual analysis suggests that during periods when fanners face higher probability of failure and the difference between on-farm and offfann utility is larger, fanners would tend rationally to increase the deterioration of their resources.
This paper also offers an empirical investigation of corn production in Illinois. This is done in order both to demonstrate the applicability of the conceptual model, and to substantiate certain conclusions that can be drawn regarding the degree of deviation from simple profit-maximization. Conventional estimation of dual functions, such as those of cost and profit, is unwarranted in the presence of risky adjustment costs. Nevertheless, the theory does admit certain restrictions to an estimable system of supply and factor demands, from which one can use output-and input-price data in the estimation of production technology. In addition to prices as explanatory variables, levels of a certain number of representative inputs (in this study, two) must be used with a corresponding reduction in the number of estimable equations. The estimation results indicate that larger farms deviate less from production efficiency than do smaller farms, where production efficiency is defined relative to strict profit maximization; and that the lesser the reliance on farm income as opposed to off-fann income the greater the production efficiency Over the period of time studied, however, fanners have been moving further from setting marginal products equal to observed prices.
' .. work for other farmers, thereby employing (at least some of) his farm-specific skills.
These employed skills, however, would likely be strictly related to farm labor rather than management of inputs (including labor). Nevertheless, the opportunity cost of the farmer's management of a farm may be the value of employment by other farmers rather than employment out of agriculture altogether. Furthel1Ilore, the utility of this farm labor may be much less than that derived from farm management.
2/ For example, Thompson, Gwynn, and Sharp report the survey of married farm women in Yolo County, California, and remark: "The increased participation by women on smaller farms was found to result from the need for the entire family to use its total resource for survival rather than to a greater opportunity for women to participate on small fanns."
3/ The models presented in this and the following section are similar to those discussed by Just and Zilbel1Ilan. The basic model offers an explanation of farmer behavior that resembles behavior arising from a safety-first objective function (pyle and Turnovsky).
4/ Sum along the central diagonal of Table 1 , taking the product of the expected utility in any year, the probability of obtaining that expected utility, and the appropriate discount factor:
Sum along a representative diagonal j steps to the left of and above the central diagonal:
Sum along a representative diagonal j steps to the right of and below the central diagonal:
Sum all the diagonat summations to obtain expression 6.
5/Equations (8a), (8b), and (8c) derive from the following first order conditions for the maximization of the objective function (7):~=
where D=I -P(I -1t).
6/ The specification of survival --covering minimal expenses --is stylized in one important way. Minimal expenses, f, is a constant, and specifically not an increasing function of three items: fann size, input use, or past failure to cover all expenses (Le., some portion of past ik). Although relaxing the current simplification would complicate the analysis, to make f a function of the first two items would not alter the basic implications of the model as long as f increases over these items at a decreasing rate.
The third item is conceptually more important. If the farmer delays payment on some portion of the cost of inputs k, one expects that portion to contribute to higher minimal expenditures in the future (or perhaps decreased output), and thus a higher future probability of failure for all levels of inputs. This would tend to blur the distinction between x and k in the active avoidance of failure. Nevertheless, as long as the farmer does not have to pay a price of delaying payment that exceeds his discount rate, and at failure time all delayed payments outstanding are forgotten, then k would be a more attractive input than x using the simple criterion of minimizing the probability of failure.
7ffhis approach is similar to that taken by Lau and Yotopoulos in their investiga-' .. 25 tion of relative production efficiency. Lau and Yotopoulos take the p's as constants over time for a given type of "fann." Their data uses averages of individual farms a a given size and region. 8/0ne potential difficulty with the SUR approach is the possible simultaneity of the representative inputs and the level of production.
9/A reviewer notes that off-farm income is some cases could be approximated by aggregate data by sales classes. Such class data, however, are not immediately applicable here. The farm sizes here for the most part are of the commercial class, although not exclusively. Moreover, the farm sizes used change over time. The results should be interpreted in this light, specifically as if the relative off-farm income across farms was a constant, and the data reflect only common changes in levels.
10ffhere are two noteworthy potential problems with this estimation method.
First the restrictions rely on estimates of the production elasticities. Interpretation of the standard errors must rely on asymptotics and caution is advised. Second, the error terms in these four equations above may not be independent of the errors in the equations representing the production relations. Ideally, a larger seven-equation system would be estimated, production relations and adjustment factors together. 
